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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I.

Whether First Amendment Establishment Clause analysis should be governed by
Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20 (2012) and the “totality of circumstances
approach?”

II.

Whether application of the governing legal standard and its progeny render the
petitioner’s legislative prayer unconstitutional under the First Amendment
Establishment Clause?
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OPINION BELOW
The opinions of the District and Appeals Courts have not been reported but appear in the
record.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are
reviewed for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.

JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered judgment on February 1, 2013. R. 34. Petitioner filed his
petition for writ of certiorari on February 7, 2013. R.35. This Court granted the petition on May
20, 2013. R. 37. This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1) (2000).

iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Factual Background
Mrs. Dhaliwal and her family moved to Martin County in April of 2011. R. 13. A month
later, Mrs. Dhaliwal took interest and began actively participating in the County’s politics by
attending its weekly Board meetings. R.13. While in attendance, she noticed a pattern of the
meetings being opened with prayers. R.7. She learned the County board adopted the prayer
practice in 1990. R. 12. A vast majority of these prayers, with the exception of two, were
Christian-led and contained references to Christian tenets. R.13. As an adherent to Sikhism, Mrs.
Dhaliwal does not believe in converting or preaching the gospel to people, thus these practices
made her feel uncomfortable. R. 7. She and her husband respectfully voiced multiple concerns
regarding the sectarian prayers. R.7, 9. None of their concerns were heeded. R.9. Rather, they
were told their request for a neutral practice forbidding sectarian reference was unusual. R.8.
The Board does not limit the content of the prayers. R.10. Its only instruction is that
invocations be less than five minutes, while limiting its selection process to be within the borders
of Martin County, which is predominately Christian. R.10. 13. Furthermore, Martin County’s
prayer practice requires all attendees to stand during Christian-led prayers but not during the
non-Christian-led prayers. R. 12, 13. As a result, Mrs. Dhaliwal feels that she and other attendees
are forced to partake in prayers in order to participate in the Board meetings. R.13. As a
minority, Mrs. Dhaliwal feels unwelcomed and an outsider in her community, since she does not
adhere to the same belief. R.14. Additionally, Martin County’s letter inviting clerics to give the
invocation illustrates its preference and endorsement of Christianity. R. 6. Mrs. Dhaliwal raises
constitutional concerns regarding the Martin County’s prayer practice and its government
endorsement of Christianity. R.14. She maintains that Martin County explicitly endorses
Christianity as the preferred religion and
1

B. Procedural Background
Mrs. Dhaliwal brought a civil action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against Martin County Board
asserting a violation of her First Amendment right. R.14. She moved for a declaratory judgment
stating Martin County’s prayer practice violates the Establishment Clause and an injunction to
enjoin it from allowing sectarian prayers at its meetings. R.14. The district court denied Mrs.
Dhaliwal’s claim and granted Martin County’s motion to dismiss based on Marsh v. Chambers,
finding the prayer practices did not infringe on attendees’ religious freedom, thus did not violate
the constition. R.28-29. Mrs. Dhaliwal appealed the judgment of the district court. The Court of
Appeals, which applied the “totality of the circumstances” approach endorsed in Galloway v.
Town of Greece, reversed the decision and concluded Martin County’s prayer practice violated
the Establishment Clause. R.33. This Court granted certiorari. R.37.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.
The governing legal standard for Establishment Clause case analysis is Lemon and its
progeny. Using Lemon, the United States Supreme Court has held the practice of opening
governmental meetings with an invocation is constitutional, so long as it does not endorse a
particular preference for a religion or coerce an individual to take part in religious activities
against their beliefs. To ensure that prayer practices fall within the safeguards of the First
Amendment and align with Lemon, the United States Supreme Court held prayers must be nonsectarian in nature to pass constitutional scrutiny.
II.
Martin County’s Board practice of opening its meetings with an invocation violates the
First Amendment Establishment Clause. Its narrow process has and will continue to cause
overwhelming Christian-led invocations, which illustrates a government endorsement of religion
by preferring Christianity over other creeds. Furthermore, the practice forces attendees, such as
Mrs. Dhaliwal, to adhere to a faith that she does not believe in and causes minorities to feel
excluded and unwelcomed in their community.

3

Argument
I.
THE PRACTICE OF OPENING GOVERNMENT MEETINGS WITH AN
INVOCATION IS GOVERNED BY THE LEGAL STANDARDS IN LEMON AND ITS
PROGENY
The practice of opening government meetings with legislative prayer as an invocation is
governed by the legal standards promulgated by this Court in Lemon in order to ensure that
individual’s constitutional rights are not infringed upon. Non-sectarian legislative prayers ensure
the protection of free exercise of religion, while safeguarding against government endorsement
of religion, which could potentially coerce an individual into participating in a religious exercise.
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 604 (1992).
A.

Tensions within the First Amendment

The assurances set forth in the United States Constitution are the cornerstone of which
the United States of America was founded. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 212-13 (1963). The Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause were incorporated into
the Constitution in order to fasten religious freedom; however, the distinction between the two is
evident and cannot be ignored. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 604. The purpose of the Establishment
Clause is to forbid “government speech endorsing religion,” while the Free Exercise Clause
allows “private speech endorsing religion.” Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 590 U.S. 290, 301
(2000); accord Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 800 (1983).
Our history illustrates the struggle between permitting the free exercise of religion and
crossing the line to a violation of the Establishment Clause. Compare McCreary Cnty v. Am.
Civil Liberties Union of Ky, 545 U.S. 844, 880 (2005) (holding display of Ten Commandments
at county courthouse is unconstitutional), with Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691 (2005)
(finding Texas’ display of Ten Commandments holds secular purpose and is thus constitutional).
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The difficulty of striking a balance between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses has
now materialized in legislative prayer cases. See Turner v. City Council, 534 F.3d 352 (4th Cir.
2008.), cert denied, 555 U.S. 1099 (2009). Ultimately, it is possible to protect against
government-established religion without sacrificing individual freedom of religion rights. See
Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty, 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2011.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1097 (2012)
(holding legislative prayers constitutional if non-sectarian). However, it is imperative that the
principles of the Establishment Clause are not taken lightly, since its principle purpose was to
avoid the destruction of our government by unionizing with religion. See Engel v. Vital, 370 U.S.
421, 428 (1962).
B.

Lemon and its progeny provides the governing legal standard

In 1971, the Court articulated the three-prong Lemon test to determine if a statute or
practice violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612 (1971). In order to survive constitutional scrutiny, the challenged statute or
practice must have a secular purpose; the primary effect cannot advance nor inhibit religion; and
it cannot foster excessive entanglement. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 602. The factors in the Lemon test
are now regarded as “helpful signposts” and its basic principles are still utilized by the Court. See
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 685.
The Court in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, expanded the effect
prong of the Lemon test to consider whether the contested government action has the purpose or
effect of “endorsing or disapproving” certain religious beliefs. 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989). In
Allegheny, the American Civil Liberties Union sought to enjoin the county from displaying a
crèche in its courthouse and a menorah in front of the City-County building. See id. at 578. In
determining the constitutionality of these symbols, the Court considered whether they conveyed
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or attempted to convey the message that a particular religious belief was preferred. Id. at 592-97.
In doing so, the Court sought to ensure that no one felt alienated and unwelcomed into his or her
“political community.” Id. at 594. The Court held that the crèche, standing alone conveyed a
religious message, which violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 597. By contrast, the menorah
withstood judicial scrutiny because it recognized “cultural diversity.” Id. at 597-618. Thus, the
Court ruled that the test to determine whether a legislative practice violated the Establishment
Clause is to ask whether it has the effect of “endorsing religious beliefs.” Id. at 594.
The Court in Lee further expanded the definition of “effect” under the Lemon analysis to
prohibit those acts which cause citizens to feel coerced to participate in religious activities
against their beliefs. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 596. In Lee, a student and her father sought to prohibit
her middle school from including invocations at public school graduations. Id. at 582. The Court
ruled that the test to determine whether government practices had the effect of endorsing religion
is to inquire whether it pressures anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise. Id. at
585. They held that by forcing students to stand and maintain respectful silence, the school
publicly pressured and coerced them to endorse a religion. This, the Court ruled, violated the
Establishment Clause. See id.
Martin County’s practice of opening their Board meetings with sectarian prayers
similarly violates the Establishment Clause when considered in light of Allegheny and Lee. By
opening each meeting with prayers that contain specific Christian references, the Board conveys
the message that Christianity is the majority religious preference over any other belief. See
Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty, 653 F.3d 341, 354 (4th Cir. 2011). When Mrs. Dhaliwal participates in
County affairs, the county’s prayers serve as a reminder that her Sikh religion is secondary to
Christianity. This is the specific harm condemned by the Court. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 621.
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Furthermore, Martin County has established a forum at a government-sponsored event, which is
similar to a state decree of religion. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 577. Mrs. Dhaliwal, a citizen of Martin
County, is pressured to participate in sectarian prayers in order to participate in the Board
meetings. Id. at 591. Not only can she not exercise her political right to participate in her
community legislation without fear of repercussion due to her minority beliefs, but she is made
to feel like an outsider and unwelcome in her own community. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). This is the specific harm condemned by the Court. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 594.
Collectively, the endorsement test applied in Allegheny and the coercion test applied in
Lee supply the controlling test for evaluating the case at hand. Both of these principles establish
that overtly sectarian prayers are unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause because
sectarian prayers can, and do, in the instant case, show a governmental body’s endorsement of
one religion and cause a citizen to feel coerced into participating in offensive religious activities.
See id. at 577.
C.

Marsh Precluding Sectarian Prayer

There has been a single occurrence in which the Court has deviated from the basic
principles set forth in Lemon. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 789. In Marsh, the Court held that the
state’s legislative practice of opening with an invocation did not violate the Establishment Clause
because they did not “exploit, proselytize, or advance” any one religion. See id. at 792. The
Marsh Court itself recognized that “historical patterns” do not support the violation of the
constitutional provisions set forth in the First Amendment. See id. at 789. The fact that Marsh
does not adhere to any of the “formal tests” that have controlled our Establishment Clause
analysis suggests that it is an “exception to the Establishment Clause” rather than “reshaping the
doctrine” for sectarian legislative prayer. Id. at 795. Thus, the decision in Marsh should be
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viewed as a “narrow and careful opinion” regarding the application of the constitutionality of
legislative prayer to only allow non-sectarian prayer. Id.
The practice of opening legislative meetings with non-sectarian prayers was found
constitutional in Marsh, when the Court noted the prayers in Marsh were formed within the
safeguards of the First Amendment because the particular chaplain had “removed all references
to Christ.” Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602; Hinrich v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated,
506 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2007) (dismissing for loss of standing). Thus, Marsh must be read to hold
that the only constitutional legislative prayers are those that are non-sectarian. See id; see also
Turner v. City of Council, 534 F.3d 352, 356 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding board’s policy to only
allow non-sectarian prayer constitutional); Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir.
2004.), cert denied, 545 U.S. 1152 (2005) (holding legislative prayers constitutional so long as
they do not discriminate against views of others).
Various lower courts have affirmed Allegheny’s reading of Marsh precluding sectarian
prayer. In Joyner v. Forsyth County, the court held the county’s prayer practices displayed a
preference for Christianity, thus unconstitutional. 653 F.3d at 344; see also Stein v. Plainwell
Community Sch., 822 F.2d 1406, 1409 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding Marsh permits only nonsectarian
prayers). The Forsyth County Board instructed all guest clerics to maintain a “spirit of respect”
for those attending the meetings and they sought to be inclusive by limiting the amount of times
any one religious leader could deliver the invocations to two meetings per year. Id. Nonetheless,
the court found that, in order to survive constitutional scrutiny, legislative prayer must “strive to
be nondenominational.” Id. at 348.
Similarly, in Hinrich v. Bosma, the court found invocations given at Indiana House
meetings unconstitutional because they were sectarian. 404 F.3d 393, 395 (7th Cir. 2006). A
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taxpayer raised the issue of whether Christian prayers at official Indiana House meetings violated
the Establishment Clause. Id. Despite attempts to diversify guest clerics, the majority of the
invocations given at Indiana House referenced Christian deity, thus the Court found that they
violated the First Amendment. See id.
Conversely, there are some circuit courts that do not read Marsh as permitting only
nonsectarian prayers. The court in Pelphrey v. Cobb County found some prayers by the Planning
Commission unconstitutional based on the selection procedures. 547 F.3d 1263, 1277 (11th Cir.
2008). In Pelphrey, the court considered whether the selection process was based on an
“impermissible motive,” and if the prayers advanced a single religion. Id. The court in Pelphrey
ruled only certain prayers to be unconstitutional because the selection procedure excluded some
faiths from presenting the invocation. Id. Pelphrey read Marsh as only allowing judges to
examine the content of prayers when they are used to “exploit or proselytize” any one belief over
another, however, no high court has affirmed this reading. Id. at 1275.
A more recent circuit court decision has implemented a new approach for examining
whether legislative prayer violates the Establishment Clause. In Galloway v. Town of Greece, the
court reversed a summary judgment that favored the Town of Greece, in order to apply a
“totality of circumstances approach.” Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20 (2nd Cir. 2012)
cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2388 (U.S. May 20, 2013) (No. 12-696.) The court looked at the prayer
selection process to consider the content of the prayers, and evaluate whether a sectarian act
violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 29. The court held that if a legislative prayer conveys to
a “reasonable observer” that there is a preference for religious beliefs, those prayers violate the
Establishment Clause. Id.
Although some lower courts do not explicitly read Marsh as only allowing non-sectarian
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prayers and have implemented other measures of examining the constitutionality of sectarian
prayers, the Supreme Court has applied Marsh to only allow those prayers that are non-sectarian.
See Lee 505 U.S. 577, Allegheny 492 U.S. 573. Thus, these are the legal standards the Court
must incorporate in the case at hand. The application of Marsh as precluding sectarian prayers
has not failed in protecting the fundamental rights allocated by the United States Constitution
and the Court should not deviate from those standards now. Therefore, the Court should apply
the Lemon and its progeny to conclude that Martin County’s prayer practice violates the
Establishment Clause.
II.

MARTIN COUNTY’S PRACTICE OF OPENING GOVERNMENTAL MEETINGS
WITH AN INVOCATION VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE.
The constitutional harm of allowing sectarian prayer is that it has the effect of endorsing
a preference for one religion and coercing individuals to participate in religious exercises against
their beliefs. Under the expanded effect prong of the Lemon test, the Supreme Court has ruled
governmental practices cannot endorse religion by conveying or attempting to convey the
message that a particular religious belief is preferred and it cannot pressure anyone to support or
participate in religion or its exercise. See Cnty of Allegheny v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 492 U.S.
573, 592 (1989); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 585 (1992). Furthermore, the Court in Marsh
prohibited the selection of speakers based on the “impermissible motive” of preferring certain
beliefs to others. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983). Thus, Martin County’s prayer
practice must be viewed as a government endorsement of religion and a violation of the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause.
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A.

Martin County’s selection process results in overwhelmingly Christian
prayer

The process employed by the governmental agency in soliciting guest clerics to deliver
the opening invocation serves a vital role in determining the constitutionality of the challenged
practice. See Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty, 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2011.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1097
(2012); Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir), cert. denied,
546 U.S. 937 (2005). By analyzing the means of selection and provided guidance, the Court is
able to determine if the prayers strive to be nonsectarian and whether the practice has the effect
of endorsing and coercing individuals to adhere to one belief over another. See Joyner, 653 F.3d
at 342.
For instance, the courts have rendered the practice of legislative prayers unconstitutional
if the result of a narrow selection process leads to an overrepresentation to the majority of
speakers or prayers being Christian. See Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20 (2nd Cir.
2012) cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2388 (U.S. May 20, 2013) (No. 12-696.) (finding town’s process
of selecting prayer-givers essentially ensured a Christian viewpoint because process was limited
to places of worship within predominately Christian borders); see also Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty.,
547 F.3d 1263, 1277 (finding prayers unconstitutional because planning commission
categorically excluded non-Christian leaders). However, a broad selection process does not
necessarily secure the practice of legislative prayers within the safeguards of the First
Amendment, especially in a community that is overtly Christian. See, e.g., Joyner, 653 F.3d at
342 (finding prayer unconstitutional despite utilizing various resources such as Yellow Pages,
internet research, and personal consultations to formulate congregational database).
Moreover, courts have held legislative prayer practices unconstitutional in instances
where the government actions offer minimal guidance. See, e.g., Galloway, 681 F. 3d at 30
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(finding County’s selection process unconstitutional when it failed to inform prayer givers that
invocations were not to be exploited as effort to convert others). Where there is minimal
diversity in who delivers the opening invocation, the lack of guidance will often lead to the
conveyance that one belief is preferred over another, since similar speakers will reference the
same religious tenets, thus the content will lack diversity. See id. Conversely, the court has held
prayer practices constitutional where guest clergy were instructed to refrain from using sectarian
references. See Simpson, 404 F.3d at 278 (holding County’s prayer practice constitutional based
on selection process which involves letter directing clerics to avoid invoking name of Jesus
Christ); see also Turner v. City Council, 534 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2008.), cert denied, 555 U.S.
1099 (2009) (affirming that Council’s decision to open legislative meetings with non-sectarian
prayers does not violate Establishment Clause).
Based on these parameters, Martin County’s selection process had, and will continue to
have, the effect of endorsing one religion and coercing individuals into participating in those
practices. The selection process employed by Martin County consists of sending form letters to
congregations within its community informing clerics of the opportunity to deliver the opening
prayer. R.12. Once a congregation has expressed interest in delivering the invocation, it is added
to a list and will be notified when to deliver the prayer. R.12. Although the County sought to
include most congregations within their community, this is not enough. See Galloway, 681 F.3d
at 30 (finding prayers unconstitutional because they are overwhelming Christian despite good
faith effort to be inclusive). This selection process was limited to the borders of Martin County,
which is overwhelmingly Christian. R.13. Thus, such a narrow search will exclude minority
religions not located within the borders of the community. See id. The fact that Martin County
limits its selection process to its own borders will inherently ensure Christian speakers, and will
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appear as if it or the Board prefers Christianity to any other belief. See id. Thus, the selection
process employed by Martin County will result in Christian-dominated speakers and prayers that
violate the Establishment Clause.
Furthermore, Martin County’s policy of limiting invocations to less than five minutes and
providing no guidance as to the content of the invocation has led to overtly Christian prayers. R.
10. Out of the annual forty-six County board meetings, thirty-five of them were given by
Christian clerics compared to the eight non-Christian clergy in 2010 and the two in 2011. R. 13.
An overwhelming number of Christian speakers gave almost entirely sectarian prayers that
referenced Christian tenets, such as “we just pray,” “we seek your love,” “our Lord Jesus
Christ,” and spoke on behalf of Martin County as a whole. R. 2. By contrast, the non-Christian
clergy contained little to no sectarian references. R. 13. Although Martin County claims to offer
no instructions on the content of the prayer, its invitation to clerics shows otherwise. R. 6. Martin
County directly solicits and endorses a preference for Christianity by stating it would be
“honored to have a prayer in the Lord Jesus’s name before its sessions.” See id. at 22; R.6.
This prayer practice will have the effect of endorsing and coercing attendees, such as Mrs.
Dhaliwal, to adhere to a belief in which they do not follow and violate their constitutional rights.
See Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004.), cert denied, 545 U.S. 1152
(2005) (finding prayers unconstitutional because they invoked “Jesus Christ” to exclusion of
other deities, thus advanced preference for Christianity over other religious beliefs).
Likewise, Martin County’s practice of having attendees stand and bow their heads before
the invocation does and will continue to force individuals, such as Mrs. Dhaliwal, to either
participate in religious exercises against their beliefs or appear to show disrespect. See id.
(finding town’s physical participation practice of standing and bowing heads places non-
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adherents in uncomfortable and coerced position to follow endorsed creed); see also, Joyner 653
F.3d at 344 (arguing County’s overwhelming Christian atmosphere made plaintiffs feel
unwelcomed in community and forced into endorsing Christianity by standing and bowing heads
during prayers). In the instant case, during most, if not all Christian-led prayers, attendees were
directed to stand prior to the invocation. R.12. The instruction to stand for Christian-led prayers
did not change despite the changes in Chairperson rotations. However, attendees were given an
option to stand, if they pleased, during the few non-Christian-led invocations. R.3, 5. These
practices convey to Mrs. Dhaliwal that Martin County endorses Christianity and expects her to
follow the majority religion as well. See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 32. This is a violation of her
constitutional rights. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 585.
Martin County’s limited outreach to congregations within its borders and its minimal
guidance on the permitted content of prayers has and will continue to invariably lead to overtly
Christian prayers, which violates the First Amendment Establishment Clause.
B.

Martin County’s Policy Implementation renders their practice of prayer
unconstitutional

Religion is a sacred and central part of an individual, and the government advancement or
endorsement of a particular faith risks offending those citizens who adhere to a different belief.
See Joyner, 653 F.3d at 356. This is the very harm the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.
Thus, notwithstanding the good intentions of a governmental policy seeking to diversify its
speakers and limit the content, if the implementation shows otherwise, the prayer practice is
unconstitutional. Id. at 354.
For instance, courts have held that, although governmental agencies may seek to solicit in
good faith a variety of religious leaders to lead their invocations, if the end result illuminates a
government preference for one religion over another by having only one faith represented in who
14

actually appears to give invocations, the practice is unconstitutional. See id. at 343 (holding
government practice unconstitutional despite Board’s policy to only allow a leader to speak
twice a year and never for consecutive meetings because they had frequent Christian references);
see also Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 295, 302 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding council
member’s invocations unconstitutional due to their sectarian references). However, if the prayer
policy is successful in its implementation of creating a diverse clergy, it is more likely to
withstand scrutiny because it sustains itself from government endorsement of religious
preference. See Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 937 (2005) (finding diversity with County’s list of available congregational
speakers reflects the Board’s requirement that prayers be non-sectarian and is thus
constitutional).
Likewise, the courts have also held prayer practices unconstitutional if they convey a
preference for one religion, despite the governmental agencies effort to withdraw themselves
from reviewing the content. See Joyner, 653 F.3d at 343 (finding practice unconstitutional
despite language of policy and the boards “hands off” approach in reviewing content because the
prayers references specific tenets of Christianity); see also Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30 (stating,
despite efforts to explain nature of its prayer program to attendees, Board cannot compensate for
overwhelming and specific sectarian Christian prayers). Thus, despite reasonable efforts to
implement a sound policy which seeks to neutralize the invocation, if the content still associates
the government with a preferred religious belief, it is unconstitutional. Id In the instant case,
although Martin County may claim to diversify their religious speakers by incorporating
invocations led by three rabbis and one by an imam, the vast majority of invocations were
delivered by Christian ministers. R. 13. In fact, during Mrs. Dhaliwal’s presence in the Board
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meetings, Martin County only had two non-Christian leaders give the invocation out of a fivemonth period. Although Martin County asserts that it made a good faith effort to expand who
delivers the opening invocation, it is not enough. See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30. Since the
majority of prayers are Christian-oriented, they convey the message that the county government
prefers Christian religion to other religions. R. 14. This is the constitutional harm that the
Establishment Clause forbids. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592 (affirming government
endorsement test forbids appearance of conveying or attempting to convey a favored religion).
Thus, when Martin County’s process and policy is scrutinized under the endorsement and
coercion analysis set forth by Lemon and its progeny, its legislative prayer practice must be
found unconstitutional. Although Martin County sought to diversify their religious speakers by
extending an invitation to all congregations within their community to deliver the invocation, it
does not hinder the fact that majority of prayers delivered reference Christianity and are sectarian
in nature. Thus, this Court should find Martin County’s prayer practice unconstitutional because
it endorses religion by conveying that Christianity is preferred and forces attendees to follow its
beliefs.
CONCLUSION
First, Lemon and its progeny should be the governing legal standards to conclude that
Martin County’s prayer practice violates the First Amendment Establishment Clause. These
basic principles have been continuously utilized by the Courts in determining the
constitutionality of governmental practices by ensuring they do not have the effect of advancing
religious preference or forcing individuals to participate in religious activities against their
beliefs. Marsh has been the single instance in which the Court has deviated from the basic
principles set forth in Lemon. Nonetheless, the Court held practices of opening legislative
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meetings permissible, so long as they are non-sectarian. Therefore, the Court should apply the
Lemon and its progeny to conclude that Martin County’s prayer practice violates the
Establishment Clause.
Based on these parameters, Martin County’s prayer practice is unconstitutional because
its narrow selection process had, and will continue to have, the effect of endorsing one religion
and coerces individuals, such as Mrs. Dhaliwal, into participating in religious practices. Its
practice of requiring attendees to stand during Christian-led prayers forces attendees to adhere to
Christianity. Furthermore, the practice makes minorities feel uncomfortable and unwelcomed in
their community. This is the very harm the Constitution forbids.
In conclusion, the Court should find Martin County’s practice of opening governmental
meetings with overwhelming Christian-led prayers unconstitutional under the First Amendment
Establishment Clause. The prayers show Martin County’s endorsement for Christianity as the
preferred religious belief and forces attendees to adhere to the same beliefs.

17

PRAYER
For these reasons, Respondent prays the Court apply Lemon and its progeny and find that
Martin County’s prayer practice violates the First Amendment Establishment Clause.

____________________________________
Nadine Rodriguez
Counsel for Respondent
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